We examine changes in controlling shareholder holdings, looking for evidence of financial tunneling (unfair wealth transfers from public investors to controlling shareholders). Our sample comprises yearly data during 2000-2011 on 75 large Israeli companies. We find that controlling shareholders are successful in timing the stock market -there exists a significant negative correlation between changes in the mean controlling shareholders' equity holdings and market return. There is also some evidence that controlling shareholders increase (decrease) their holdings before years of positive (negative) excess returns in their shares. However, statistically significant mean excess returns are documented only after decreases in controlling shareholders holdings. Thus, we offer only limited support for the financial tunneling hypothesis. 
Introduction
Most public companies outside the U.S. and U.K. (and some of the U.S. and U.K.
firms -see Holderness, 2009 ) have a control group (an individual, family or coalition of a few dominant partners) that owns a large portion of the company's shares and controls the company's votes and decisions. The financial literature has identified a serious agency problem with this type of holding structure: the control group has the ability to extract from the company benefits for itself only ("private benefits"), at the expense of the rest of the shareholders (minority shareholders).
This study focuses on a particular form of private benefits extraction -financial tunneling. Our specific hypothesis is that controlling shareholders have superior "inside" information regarding the firm, and change their holdings and stake in the firm in accordance with this private information. When they know that the firm's share is underpriced, controlling shareholders increase their proportion in the firm, and vice versa when it is overpriced. By doing so, controlling shareholders profit at the expense of the "simple" public investors. On reflection, financial tunneling is essentially a generalization of the well known insider-trading phenomenon.
While insider trading has been extensively studies, evidence on other financial tunneling instruments and on the overall phenomenon of financial tunneling has been scarce. Previous studies document specific mechanisms of financial tunneling such as insider trading (Hirschey and Zaima, 1989 and Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005) or sales of equity stakes by the listed company to its controlling shareholders at below market prices (Cheung et al., 2006 and Peng et al., 2011) . We contribute to existing literature by 3 focusing on a variable that aggregates almost all financial tunneling processes -the total change in controlling shareholders' proportion in the firm. Given that the various alternative financial tunneling mechanisms are substitutes, financial tunneling might be most evident when studying the total change in controlling shareholders proportion in firm's equity. 1 We do not contend that it is not important to inquire how exactly, i.e., by which "micro" mechanism, controlling shareholders financially tunnel. Rather, we argue that it is also interesting to examine the "macro" variable that aggregates most of these activities -the total change in controlling shareholders' proportion in firm's equity.
We offer three tests of the financial tunneling hypothesis. The first focuses on the general stock market trend: Do controlling owners exploit periods of decline in the stock market in order to increase their stake in the company, and later on sell these surplus holdings to the public when the stock market rises? This first test is somewhat indirect because it can be argued that it just examines the general stock market timing abilities of controlling shareholders. The second and more direct test isolates large changes in controlling shareholders holdings and inquires whether large increases (decreases) in these holdings precede years of positive (negative) excess returns in the firms' shares. The third test is related to the second one. If controlling shareholders exploit private information, the timing of large changes in controlling shareholders holdings would be "correct", that is in the year after an increase (decrease) in controlling shareholders holdings, the shares' excess return would be positive (negative, respectively).
1 Changes in controlling shareholder holdings are particularly interesting in closely held firms. This is because in these firms there are several other mechanisms besides direct insider trading that may be exploited in financial tunneling attempts. For example, some financial transactions of the firms such as seasoned equity offers, private placements, rights offering, transactions in Treasury shares and others, may also serve financial tunneling. Thus, it appears that the financial tunneling problem in closely-held firms is more challenging than in disperse ownership firms. The empirical results partially support the financial tunneling hypothesis. We document a significant negative correlation between the stock market annual return and the (across-firms) average change in controlling shareholders' holdings. Evidently, controlling shareholders increase their proportion in the firm when the stock market declines and decrease their proportion in the firm when the stock market rises. This "contrarian" strategy enriches controlling shareholders on average. The second test weakly supports the tunneling hypothesis, as we find (with marginal statistical significance) that the tendency of controlling shareholders to increase or decrease holdings depends on their firm share's excess return in the year after the holding change.
Increases in controlling shareholders holdings are more likely before a year of positive excess returns. Our third test also partially supports the financial tunneling hypothesis.
The signs of the mean excess returns after large changes in controlling shareholders' holdings are consistent with the financial tunneling hypothesis; however statistically significant excess returns are documented only for the case of a decrease in controlling shareholder holdings. Overall, given that our evidence is consistent with the financial 5 tunneling hypothesis, we cautiously suggest that in some firms and on some occasions, controlling shareholders have engaged in financial tunneling.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers some background on financial tunneling, and presents our tests. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the first to formally define the agency problem of closely held firms: firm's controlling shareholders who dominate firm's vote (and decision making) have both an interest and the ability to exploit their power and extract private benefits from the company. The term "private benefits" was defined by Bebchuk and Kahan (1990) as any value, received or perceived by the controlling shareholders, that is not shared with the rest of the shareholders. Obviously, private benefits consumption by the controlling shareholders is generally at the expense of public shareholders who receive lower proceeds from the firm.
Background and Testable Propositions
One of the mechanisms for extracting private benefits has been offered the name "tunneling" by Johnson, Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) . According to Johnson et al. (2000) tunneling comprises two main activities: (1) "self-dealing" transactions, whereby controlling shareholders receive exaggerated compensation from the firm, and/or execute "related party" transactions with the firm at unfair prices that are favorable to them, and/or "front-run" on the company's most prospective investment opportunities; (2) Financial transactions such as some sorts of private placements that eventually tend to exploit and discriminate the minority. freezeouts (transactions in which insiders take the firm private) for less than fair market value; loans from the firm to insiders (which will not be repaid in a bad economy, and hence act partly as put options); sale of a controlling stake (without an offer to buy minority shares); repurchase of shares from insiders for more than fair value (diluting the value of the minority shares); and equity-based executive compensation that exceeds a market rate for services.
Existing literature on the phenomenon of tunneling is diverse. In this study we depart from the "micro" analysis (i.e., from studies of individual financial tunneling mechanisms), and examine the "macro" picture, i.e., the time series of total changes in controlling shareholders proportion in their firms. While we recognize the great and perhaps superior scientific value of "micro" studies, there are also advantages to a "macro" analysis. For if, different tunneling mechanisms are substitutes, the bottom-line aggregate numbers are most descriptive. Admittedly, some or even most of the changes in controlling shareholders holdings may not emanate from financial tunneling motives. However, the same criticism applies to the "micro" studies, where the specific mechanism may also serve legitimate business purposes ("propping") and not only financial tunneling. Anyway, it appears useful to examine also what the total and average changes in controlling shareholders holdings can tell us.
Specifically, we propose three empirical tests of financial tunneling. The first follows the mean changes in controlling shareholders holdings during years of stock markets rise (boom periods) and decline (bear periods). Periods of continued advance or continued retreat in stock markets may generate (at least on occasions) a temporary 8 wedge between market prices and the shares' economic value. Consequently, controlling shareholders, who possess more accurate information about the company value, may exploit their superior private information to increase their proportion in the firm when shares are underpriced (typically in bear markets) and decrease their proportion in the firm when shares are overpriced (typically at bull markets). If this contrarian activity of controlling shareholders is prevalent in reality, we expect to find a negative correlation between the market index yearly return and the mean yearly change in controlling shareholders proportion in publically traded companies.
The second test is more direct. We focus on large changes in controlling shareholders holdings. If financial tunneling plays a role in these significant holding changes then we expect a higher likelihood of holding increases before a year of positive excess return in the firm's share. We will employ a difference in proportion z-test to compare the proportion of holding increases in year t before a "good" (= positive excess return) year t+1 with the counterpart proportion before a "bad" (= negative excess return) year t+1.
The third and perhaps most direct test proposes that if changes in controlling shareholders holdings is driven by inside information, then following an increase (decrease) in controlling shareholder proportion in firm Y its share would record significantly positive (negative) excess returns on average.
Sample and Data
Our initial sample comprises all closely-held companies included in the Tel Aviv-100 index at the beginning of year 2000. Tel Aviv-100 is a share price index of the 100 9 highest free-float stocks traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, and it is basically an index of the largest companies' shares traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Also noteworthy, a closely held firm is defined by us as a firm in which controlling shareholders control over 40% of the vote.
From the initial sample we exclude all dually-listed companies, namely all companies whose shares were also traded on a foreign exchange (U.S. and U.K exchanges in our case). This is because controlling shareholders in dually-listed firms, Stock Exchange we resorted to stock return data from Predicta (a local data base vendor).
Two sample or methodological comments are in order. First, in our second and third tests, looking at excess returns after changes in controlling shareholders' holdings, we narrow the sample to large holding changes only. We suspect that most small changes in controlling shareholders holdings are innocuous, that is may arise from personal liquidity or other non-tunneling related motives. Thus, in order to achieve some inference power, we filter out yearly changes of less than 1% in controlling shareholders holdings.
Unfortunately, 58 of the 276 large holding changes in our sample are further excluded because in cases such as freezeouts (buying all company shares from the public) or initial public offers, stock price data in the year after and/or before the large change do not exist.
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The second methodological issue concerns excess return estimation. For each large change "event", we fit the market model in the 36 months period including the change calendar year (year t) and the two calendar years surrounding it (year t-1 and year t+1). The 36 month period is methodologically sufficient for excess return estimation and it minimizes possible overlap between adjacent large changes in the same firm. The excess return in a particular month is estimated by the market model residual in that month, and the excess return in a particular calendar year is approximated by the sum of firm's excess return in that year 12 months. One of the problems of the study is that we lack a clear event month. This is because most of our large changes consist of several changes in controlling shareholders holdings within a particular calendar year. Thus, our time measurement units are calendar years, which may be too gross for precise response estimation. Our first empirical test examines the correlation between the annual change in controlling shareholders mean vote and the Tel Aviv-100 (market index) annual return.
Empirical results
The financial tunneling hypothesis predicts a negative correlation between these two variables, i.e., that the control group typically increases its holdings during declining markets and decreases its holdings during rising markets. At this point, it is important to note that we cannot prove that the phenomenon of "increasing holdings when stock market prices are relatively cheap and decreasing holdings when stock market prices are relatively high" is planned ahead of time by controlling shareholders. It is possible that this negative correlation is forced upon controlling shareholders -during periods of decline they are often required to assist their firms, i.e., to increase their holdings. And, during periods of growth, they (controlling owners) need external equity to expand the firm, thereby diluting their own holdings.
Moreover, all that Table 2 documents is successful "market timing" by the controlling shareholders on average. Empirically, we restrict our attention to the subsample of 218 large changes (changes of over 1%) in controlling shareholders holdings. This is because as explained in section 3, we expect less noise and more powerful inference in this subsample. In total, there are 112 large holding increases and 106 large holding decreases in our subsample.
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For each of the changes we estimate the excess return in the year before, year of, and year after the change.
When the large holding change precedes a year with a positive excess return the proportion of holding increases is 0.567, and when it precedes a year with a negative excess return the proportion of holding increases is 0.471. Holding increases appear 0.096 (about 10%) more frequent before a "good" year of the company shares. The difference in proportions z-statistic is 1.4, implying that the null hypothesis of no relation between current holding changes and future excess returns can be rejected at the 10% significance 16 level against the one-sided alternative that holding increases are more likely before a positive excess return year.
The finding that holding increases are more likely ahead of a positive excess return year is consistent with the financial tunneling hypothesis. However, it is also important to note the raw numbers. In the "ideal" conditions, i.e., before a positive excess returns year, the frequency of holding increases (0.567) is close to 0.5 (the expected frequency under the no-relation null hypothesis). Hence, not only is the test z-statistic marginal, the effect itself also appears minute.
On reflection, it is possible that the problems of our sample, mainly the absence of a clear event date, generate our weak results. However, alternatively, it is also possible that controlling shareholders are reluctant to exploit their private information for the purpose of financial tunneling. The reluctance to financially tunnel may be a rational valuation-based controlling shareholder decision. For if financial tunneling is disclosed, controlling shareholder reputation is stained and firm share price declines. Perhaps controlling shareholders in our sample weighed the benefits of financial tunneling against its costs (i.e., against their own wealth loss given the decline in market price upon recognition of financial tunneling), and rationally decided to financially tunnel only rarely.
Our third test of the financial tunneling hypothesis is a variation of the second test. If some changes in controlling shareholders' proportion in firm's equity are motivated by inside information, we should observe positive excess returns on average in the period after controlling shareholders increased their holdings and negative excess returns on average after they decreased it. However, when we examine the increases in controlling shareholders holdings (Panel B), we find a statistically insignificant mean excess return of 1.36% in the year after the large increases. The sign of this mean excess return is consistent with the financial tunneling hypothesis, yet the lack of statistical significance shows that the subsample of large increases in controlling shareholders holdings only weakly supports the financial tunneling hypothesis. It is possible that the small positive response is due to some contamination in the increased holdings sample. During the sample period the average holdings of controlling shareholders increased. Thus, some of the "increase holdings" transactions may be benign and did not emanate from inside information. 10, 11 [Insert Table 3 about here] Before concluding, it is also interesting to examine the pre-change stock performance. Financial tunneling appears even more enticing for controlling shareholders when past excess returns on the firm's share are opposite in sign to the future expected excess returns. If next-year expected excess returns are positive (negative) and previous-10 Similar results are obtained when we use only changes of at least 2% in controlling shareholders' vote.
11 Other possible reasons for the rather limited success in the third test may be identical to the reasons for the weak support of the financial tunneling hypothesis in our second test -see the above discussion. It is either that our tests are powerless or that controlling shareholders are reluctant to financially tunnel.
18 year excess returns are negative (positive), the psychological or behavioral stimulus for financial tunneling appears relatively strong.
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In Table 3 we observe that in the year before holding increases the mean excess return is negative (-3.03%) and in the year before holding decreases the mean excess return is positive (1.80%). Consistently with the above behavioral bias conjecture, controlling shareholders decrease their holdings after abnormal advances in their firm's share price and increase their holdings after their share price lags behind. However, both pre-change years' excess returns are statistically insignificant, preventing us from any meaningful inference on the behavioral bias conjecture.
Summary and Conclusions
We examine changes in controlling shareholders proportion in their firms, trying In the second test we find that the tendency of controlling shareholders to increase or decrease holdings depends on their firm share's excess return in the year following the change in holdings. Increases in controlling shareholders' holdings are somewhat more likely before a year of positive excess returns.
Our third test also partially supports the financial tunneling hypothesis. The signs of the mean excess returns in the year after large changes in controlling shareholders' holdings are consistent with the financial tunneling hypothesis; however, statistical significance is achieved in only part of the cases.
The successful timing abilities of controlling shareholders unveiled in this study provide them profits at the expense of the public, which raises the suspicion that it is an unfair zero-sum game, namely financial tunneling. Controlling shareholders may have exploited their inside information to expropriate wealth from innocent public investors.
However, given that our evidence is sometimes statistically insignificant and provides only limited support to the financial tunneling hypothesis, we do not argue that we have shown that financial tunneling is a well-established phenomenon and a major problem.
It is possible that our "weak support" results are due to our sample problems. On the other hand, it is also possible that some controlling shareholders shy away from financial tunneling opportunities because they fear its potential negative impact on firm's reputation, the company share prices and ultimately on their own (controlling 20 shareholders) wealth value. In such a case, our weak supportive results may be common and recurring in future financial tunneling research as well. Clearly, despite our novel tests and new evidence consistent with financial tunneling, we have not settled the issue.
The quest for more extensive tests and more evidence on financial tunneling continues. 
